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Cuba, U.S. Naval Blockade of 
Start Date:  April 22, 1898 
End Date:  August 14, 1898 
 
     As early as March 23, 1898, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long produced a 
plan to close the ports along the western half of Cuba’s northern coast.  On April 
18, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, commander of the North Atlantic Squadron, 
issued a memorandum concerning ship dispositions for such a blockade.  In early 
1898, the U.S. Navy possessed 96 ships of varying qualities and capabilities.  
However, the navy’s ability to enforce a blockade of Cuba was augmented 
substantially by a $50 million emergency congressional appropriations bill passed 
on March 9.  That bill authorized the purchasing or leasing of additional ships 
from private sources and other government agencies, including the U.S. Revenue 
Cutter Service. 
     Sampson’s squadron began the process of implementing the blockade on April 
22 when his ships sailed from Key Est, Florida for Cuba.  Although the blockade 
officially commenced on the morning of April 23, it took time to fully implement 
because of delays in providing adequate numbers of ships as well as the requisite 
logistical support for the fleet, such as coal, food, and fresh water.  Sampson was 
hard-pressed to cover 2,000 miles of Cuban shoreline with just 26 ships.  The 
shortage of ships prevented him from maintaining a continuous blockade of it 
until June 28.  By late June, Sampson was able to close off the southern ports as 
well, preventing the Spanish from obtaining supplies from Mexico and Central 
America.  Eventually his squadron grew to 124 ships.  Still, his naval assets were 
spread perilously thin given the long shorelines and distances involved, and 
occasionally ships were absent on other duties.  Additional ships were continually 
added to enforce the blockade, the most famous of these being the battleship 
Oregon, which steamed from its Bremerton, Washington, home port around 
South America to reach Key West. 
     The blockade was carried out according to international law, with ships having 
left Spain prior to the war being declared immune from search.  Spanish vessels 
that were docked in U.S. ports when the war was declared were given until May 
21 to leave and were permitted to take on enough coal to reach their home port.  
However, inconsistencies in blockade enforcement did occur.  On August 8, 1898, 
a Navy Department official reported that three neutral nations were filing 
complaints with the U.S. State Department about their vessels being seized and 
expressing concern about potentially costly damage claims that ship owners could 
file against the United States. 
     The blockaders intercepted ships in transit to Cuba, seized contraband goods 
consistent with maritime law provisions, and engaged in several battles with 
Spanish ships.  The first of these clashes occurred on April 27 when U.S. ships 
were fired upon and responded by shelling Punta Gorda at Matanzas to prevent 
construction of Spanish artillery batteries there. 
     Further combat actions occurred on May 11 when U.S. warships cut the cable 
to Madrid at Cienfuegos.  Later that same day hidden Spanish batteries at 
Cárdenas attacked several U.S. ships including the torpedo boat Winslow, which 
was seriously damaged. 
     Another U.S. squadron, commanded by Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, was 
ordered to leave Charleston, South Carolina, for Key West to prepare to intercept 
a Spanish squadron under Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, believed to be 
headed to Cuba from the Cape Verde Islands.  Schley’s squadron arrived off 
Santiago on May 26.  These reinforcements enabled a southern front to be added 
to the U.S. naval blockade.  In the Meantime, however, Cervera’s ships had 
managed to make it to Santiago de Cuba unhindered.  Sampson then 
administered a tight blockade of Santiago.  On the morning of July 3, 1898, 
Spanish forces attempted to break out of a harbor there, producing a running 
battle in which all the Spanish ships were either sunk or scuttled. 
     Assorted other engagements between U.S. and Spanish forces occurred at 
various locations in Cuba, including west of the Isle of Pines, Barracoa, and 
Manzillo, which resulted in Spanish ships being destroyed or captured along with 
some modest U.S. uses.  The war ended with a cease-fire agreement on August 
12, 1898, although American naval assets remained in the area for a considerable 
time thereafter.  The naval blockade was officially lifted on August 14. 
     Despite some inconsistency in execution and enforcement, the blockade was 
relatively successful in cutting off Spanish forces from supplies and 
reinforcements.  A number of blockade runners did make it through the blockade, 
the most famous of these being the Montserrat.  Many others were either 
destroyed or captured, however.  Significant credit for the blockade’s military 
successes stems from effective planning and training exercises conducted by the 
U.S. Naval War College and Office of Naval Intelligence in the years before the war 
and to legislation in 1890 and 1892 authorizing new naval construction.  The 
blockade did cause some hardship for the Cuban civilian population in the way of 
food shortages and clothing, and a scarcity of kerosene, but its relatively short 
duration prevented these shortages from becoming more severe. 
                                                                                                             BERT CHAPMAN 
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